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 1 
Summary 
The Swedish pharmacy monopoly was established 1970. The purpose of the 
monopoly was to adapt to the medical, technical and economical 
development. The Hanner case started 2005, when the Stockholm district 
court requested a preliminary ruling concerning the Swedish pharmacy 
monopoly. Krister Hanner was charged with marketing non-prescription 
medicinal preparations, against the Law on medicinal preparations. Hanner 
questioned the Swedish regulation’s compliance with the EU legislation and 
so did the ECJ. A few years before the Hanner case, the Landskrona district 
court referred questions to the ECJ concerning the State monopoly on the 
retail of alcoholic beverages. Franzén was charged with violation of 
Alkohollagen – the Law on Alcohol, because he had sold wine.  
 
The ECJ stated in the cases that Article 37.1 TFEU shall be applied on State 
monopolies of a commercial character. The selection system of a sales 
monopoly shall be founded on criterions that are independent from the 
origin of the products and give an opportunity to insight, motivations of 
decisions and an independent monitoring procedure. In the Hanner case you 
can see that the risk of discrimination is enough to make a national 
legislation inconsistent with EU rules.  
 
The Swedish government wanted to sell Apoteket AB in order to give the 
consumers more possibilities in the market and to put the market into 
competition. The Government was optimistic because of positive facts on 
the liberalisation of other markets in Sweden. However, the report from the 
Swedish National Audit Office presented a work that could have been done 
in a better way. The pharmacy monopoly as it was  2005 was not EU 
consistent, but the ruling from the ECJ did not mean the end for the state 
owned pharmacy as such. Had Sweden changed its regulations according to 
the ECJ’s comments, the transparency  would have increased and the risks 
of discrimination would have decreased considerably.  
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Sammanfattning 
Det svenska apoteksmonopolet etablerades 1970. Syftet med monopolet var 
att anpassa apoteksmarknaden till medicinsk, teknisk och ekonomisk 
utveckling. Målet Hanner påbörjades 2005, när Stockholms tingsrätt 
begärde förhandsavgörande angående det svenska apoteksmonopolet. 
Krister Hanner var åtalad för att ha sålt icke receptbelagda rökavvänjnings 
produkter. Detta stred mot Läkemedelslagen. Hanner ifrågasatte den 
svenska lagens överensstämmelse med EU-rätten, vilket också EU-
domstolen gjorde. Några år innan Hanner-fallet begärde Landskrona 
tingsrätt ett förhandsavgörande beträffande Systembolagets monopol.  
Franzén hette mannen som var åtalad för brott mot Alkohollagen eftersom 
han hade sålt vin, vilket ju Systembolaget har ensamrätt på.  
 
EU-domstolen konstaterade i de båda fallen att artikel 37.1 TFEU var 
tillämplig på statliga handelsmonopol.  Monopolets urvalssystem skall vara 
utformat med kriterier som är oberoende av produkternas ursprung och ge 
möjlighet till inblick i systemet, motiverade beslut och en oberoende instans 
dit man kan överklaga. I Hanner-fallet kunde man att se att bara en risk för 
diskriminering var oförenlig med EU-rätten.  
 
Regeringen ville sälja Apoteket AB för att utöka konsumenternas inflytande 
på marknaden och konkurrenssätta apoteksmarknaden. Regeringen var 
optimistisk eftersom tidigare konkurrenssättning av andra marknader 
verkade ha gett positive effekt. Rapporten från Riksrevisionen visade dock 
att avregleringen hade kunnat gå till på ett bättre sätt. Apoteksmonpolet så 
som det såg ut 2005 var inte förenligt med EU-rätten, men domen innebar 
inte att Apoteksmonopolet nödvändigtvis behövde upphöra. Om Sverige 
helt enkelt hade ändrat reglerna efter EU-domstolens dom så hade 
transparensen ökat och riskerna för diskriminering hade minskat avsevärt.   
 3 
Abbreviations 
ECJ  The European Court of Justice 
EU  The European Union  
Läkemedelslagen  Lag (1996:1152) om handel med läkemedel m.m. 
Prop.  Proposition 
SOU  Statens offentliga utredningar 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
The legislation on state monopolies is an interesting area in the European 
Union since it is connected to the free movement, the freedom of 
establishment and other parts of the EU foundation. Nevertheless, it is also 
one of the areas that are being regulated in major part by national laws.   
 
During the past years, the European Union has adjudicated some cases 
concerning the State monopolies in the EU. In certain Member States a 
liberalisation of markets has been seen. The purpose is often to put the 
goods and services concerned into full competition, approve the consumers’ 
accessibility and adjust to the EU regulation. This is however, a delicate 
political matter, seeing that there often are social interests and financial 
interests of the State involved.   
 
Since 1970, the Swedish State owned the Swedish pharmacies. This 
changed when the Government sold the major part of the pharmacy 
monopoly three years ago. The rest remained a company owned by the 
State. When the Swedish Parliament, suggested an abolishment of the 
monopoly, it considered mainly two things – an improvement of the 
consumers’ situation in the market and consistency with the EU rules 
concerning the free movement of goods. However, did the Government have 
to sell the pharmacy monopoly in order to fulfil the obligation towards the 
EU? Systembolaget, the Swedish monopoly on the retail of alcoholic 
beverages, is still a state owned monopoly, in compliance with a judgment 
by the European Court of Justice. This is possible because the Member 
States are obligated to ensure that there will be no discrimination because of 
the state monopolies, but the state monopolies are not per se forbidden.   
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1.1 Question and Purpose  
The purpose of my essay is to discuss the abolishment of the Swedish 
pharmacy monopoly and describe the legal position of the State monopolies 
in the European Union: 
 What is the ECJ’s view on State monopolies, in which cases are 
State monopolies allowed and when are they not?  
 Are there any problems with ECJ’s judgments – judicial and 
political? 
 Why did the Government decided to sell the pharmacies and how did 
the selling turn out? 
 Did the Swedish Government have to sell the Pharmacy monopoly 
according to EU rules?  How could it have remained a monopoly 
without being a breach of the EU legislation?  
 
1.2 Method and materials 
I have used the traditional dogmatic method and also applied a critical view 
during my work with this essay, i.e. I have used the legal material of the EU 
– the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the two 
decisions Hanner and Franzén from the ECJ. I have read many articles 
regarding the subject, but I am only referring to one in my essay. This is due 
to the questions I want to answer and the limitation of pages and time. The 
government bill concerning the suggestion to sell the pharmacy monopoly 
has been very useful, as well as the report concerning selling of other 
monopolies and the report examining the selling of the pharmacies. The 
article by Fritz on the Franzén judgment has been useful in explaining the 
view on Systembolaget before Sweden became a member of the European 
Union.  
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1.3 Delimitations  
In my essay, I will explain the former Swedish pharmacy monopoly and the 
still existing monopoly on the retail of alcoholic beverages. These 
monopolies will be looked at from an EU perspective, not so much from a 
national legal perspective. Other Swedish monopolies are excluded from the 
discussion, except concerning what you could learn from them in order to 
reregulate the pharmacy market.  
 
1.4 Outline 
In chapter two I will explain the Swedish pharmacy monopoly, how it was 
worked out before the Hanner judgment, the circumstances of the case and 
what happened after the judgment. I will also discuss liberalisation of other 
markets in Sweden because that has been an important consideration for the 
Government while changing the system of the pharmacies. The Swedish 
monopoly on the retail of alcoholic beverages shall I describe in chapter 
three. In chapter four, I will discuss the EU rules on State monopolies, and 
other EU rules that might be of interest. In chapter five, I will analyse the 
Swedish monopolies and the EU rules.  
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2 The abolishment of the 
Swedish pharmacy monopoly 
2.1 The monopoly before the reform 
The Swedish State and Apotekarsocieteten – the Society of Pharmacists, 
decided 1969 to regulate the Swedish pharmacy market and establish a 
monopoly. The Swedish pharmacy monopoly was established 1970. The 
purpose of the monopoly was to adapt to the medical, technical and 
economical development and even in the future being able to provide a 
sufficient supply of medicinal preparations. Apoteksbolaget AB – the 
pharmacy company, would also contribute to enhanced information on 
medicinal preparations, unrestrained from the interests of the producers. The 
state owned Apoteksbolaget AB by two thirds and Apotekarsocieteten 
owned one third. The owner conditions remained unchanged until 1981, 
when Apotekarsocieteten sold their shares. In 1995 the Swedish Parliament 
decided that all the shares were to be owned by the State. Apoteksbolaget 
AB changed the name to Apoteket AB in 1998.
1
  
 
In 2005, the Stockholm district court requested a preliminary ruling 
concerning the Swedish pharmacy monopoly’s accordance with the EU 
legislation. The reason was that the Swedish authorities prosecuted Krister 
Hanner in his capacity as managing director of the company Bringwell 
International AB. This company sold non-prescription medicinal 
preparations, which was inconsistent with the Swedish rules on medicinal 
preparations.
2
 According to Article 4 in the former Law on medicinal 
preparations (Läkemedelslagen), only the State or a legal person over which 
the State had dominant influence could be engaged in retail trade in non-
prescription and prescription medicinal preparations. Article 5 in the Law on 
                                                 
1
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 53-54. 
2
 C-438/02 Hanner, para. 16.  
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medicinal preparations stated that medicinal preparations were only allowed 
on the Swedish market after being approved by the competent Swedish 
authority or the authority of another Member State. Thus, other operators 
than those in Article 4 could sell medicinal preparations, provided that they 
had a licence from the competent Swedish authority. According to Article 6, 
the distribution of the medicinal preparations should be engaged rationally 
and in a way to secure the need of effective medicinal preparations.  
 
Apoteket AB was provided medicinal preparations either directly by 
manufacturers in Sweden or by two wholesalers – Kronans droghandel and 
Tamro. The wholesalers carried out deliveries to Apoteket, practically 
without selling on their own.
3
   
 
At the time of the trial Apoteket had 800 pharmacies at its disposal, all 
owned and run by Apoteket. Apoteket decided the localisation of the 
pharmacies in cooperation with municipalities and health authorities. 
Apoteket used and supervised approximately 970 pharmaceutical agents in 
sparsely populated areas. These were entrepreneurs, often local provision 
merchants, who provided prescription medicinal preparations. At some 
places, consumers could buy certain non-prescription medicinal 
preparations. Apoteket owned the supplies of the medicinal preparations and 
the regional manager of Apoteket chose the assortment in consultation with 
the local health services. Consumers could also order non-prescription 
medicinal preparations over the telephone.
4
      
 
According to the 1996 contract between the Swedish State and Apoteket, 
the latter was required to organize a nationwide system to distribute 
medicinal preparations, adjusted to local conditions and fulfil the demands 
in the Law on medicinal preparations, e.g. Article 6. Apoteket was also 
obligated to guard the interests of the consumers while deciding the 
localisation and configuration of the sales outlets, have the requested 
                                                 
3
 Hanner, para. 13.  
4
 Hanner, para. 14.  
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supplies and be ready to deliver. It should also provide for all medicinal 
preparations, both prescription and non-prescription. Apoteket should 
ensure that medicinal preparations would be sold by the lowest price 
possible. The selling prices should be uniform all over the country and 
Apoteket were to work on an ongoing rationalisation and render the 
organization more effective. It should also give neutral information to their 
clients.
5
             
 
2.2 The ECJ judgment in the Hanner case 
Krister Hanner was charged with marketing Nicorette patches and chewing 
gum, non-prescriptions for the treatment of nicotine dependence, against the 
Law on medicinal preparations. These products for facilitate smoking 
cessation were considered non-prescription preparations and were therefore 
not allowed to be sold by anyone except Apoteket or its pharmaceutical 
agents. Hanner claimed that the state owned monopoly was inconsistent 
with the (present) Articles 34, 37 and 49 TFEU.
6
 The questions for the ECJ 
from the Stockholm district court were whether these articles and the 
principle of proportionality were an obstacle to the Swedish legislation on 
medicinal preparations. The Stockholm district court also asked if the 
judgment was effected by the fact that only the State or a legal person over 
which the State had dominant influence could be engaged in retail trade in 
non- prescription and prescription medicinal preparations.
7
         
 
The ECJ stated that it is evident from the first subparagraph that Article 37.1 
TFEU (the then in force Article 31 EC) shall be applied on State monopolies 
of a commercial character. The article is applicable on “any body through 
which a Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly 
supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports between 
                                                 
5
 Hanner, para. 15.  
6
 Hanner, para. 16-17.  
7
 Hanner, para. 18.  
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Member States.”8 The sales regime in question is a State monopoly 
according to Article 37.1 since Apoteket carries on a retail trade of which it 
has a sole right according to the Law on medicinal preparations. Article 37.1 
does not demand abolishment of State monopolies but dictates that the 
monopolies shall be adjusted in a way that no discrimination concerning 
procurement and marketing conditions exists between the citizens of the 
Member States.
9
 The purpose of this article is namely to unite the demands 
that are followed by the establishment and functioning of the common 
market with the possibility for the Member States to maintain some 
commercial monopolies in order to achieve certain goals of the public’s 
interest. The intention of the article is to remove all obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, though with exception to the limitation of the trade that 
is a necessary consequence of an existing monopoly. Monopolies, which 
treat the trade with goods from other Member States unfairly, are 
forbidden.
10
   
 
The selection system of a sales monopoly shall be founded on criterions that 
are independent from the origin of the products and give an opportunity to 
insight through laying down demands on motivations of decisions and an 
independent monitoring procedure. Neither shall the retail network of the 
monopoly limit the consumers’ access to medicinal preparations. The 
monopoly’s marketing and information on the products shall also be 
impartial and indifferent to the origin of the products and have the purpose 
of making new products known to the consumers.
11
  
 
ECJ made it clear that the monopoly of Apoteket was problematic since the 
1996 contract did not regulate a purchasing plan or a system of 
procurement. The producers did not get to know the reasons for the rejection 
of their products and the contract did not give an opportunity to appeal the 
decision to an independent supervisory authority. On the contrary, Apoteket 
                                                 
8
 Hanner, para. 32. 
9
 Hanner, para. 33-34.  
10
 Hanner, para. 35-36. 
11
 Hanner, para. 39-41.  
 11 
seemed to freely being able to choose the assortment. Consequently, the 
1996 contract did not rule out discrimination. Nor did the Swedish 
Government refer to a different measure that would compensate the lack of 
structural guaranties. Thus, Apoteket had the possibility to treat medicinal 
preparations from other member States differently than the Swedish 
produced medicinal preparations. In consequence, the monopoly was 
incompatible with Article 37.1 TFEU.
12
 The ECJ did not find it necessary to 
examine whether Apoteket did “in practise place medicinal preparations 
from other Member States at a disadvantage” [emphasis added],13 
apparently, because there was a discrimination in law.  
 
ECJ also looked at Article 106 TFEU (previously Article 86 EC) since it 
regards companies that operate services of general economic interest. 
According to ECJ’s case law this article could be referred to by the Member 
State in order to grant exclusive rights, which were inconsistent to Article 
37.1., to companies. This is possible if the fulfilment of the special tasks that 
the company has been assigned to cannot be ascertained in another way and 
if the development of the trade is not affected in a way incompatible with 
the interests of the Community. ECJ did though elucidate that the 
organization of Apoteket was not consistent with Article 106 because of the 
lack of a selection system that ruled out discrimination. The monopoly 
operated by Apoteket was consequently inconsistent with Article 37.1 and 
therefore ECJ had no reason to examine the other questions from the 
Stockholm district court.
14
   
 
                                                 
12
 Hanner, para. 42-44.  
13
 Hanner, para. 45.  
14
 Hanner, para. 47-50.  
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2.3 The purposes of selling the 
pharmacies 
The Swedish Government decided on 21 December 2006 to examine 
whether it was possible for other performers than Apoteket to engage in 
retail trade in non-prescription and prescription medicinal preparations. This 
inquiry led to a proposal of amendments of several laws, one of them was 
the earlier mentioned Law on medicinal preparations.
15
   
 
In the government bill Prop. 2008/09:145 concerning the reregulation of the 
pharmacy market, the liberalisation of other markets in Sweden was 
discussed. The markets of telecommunication, electricity, domestic aviation, 
railways, postal services and taxi were completely or partly exposed to 
competition during the 1990s.
16
 The government bill said that mostly 
positive effects were seen from the liberalisation of other markets, e.g. 
concerning the consumers’ perspective and the national economy.17 The 
government bill referred to a report where the long-term effects of e.g. the 
economic life, the consumers and the labour market were discussed.
18
 The 
conclusion of the report was that the liberalisation had both negative and 
positive effects. The prices, compared with the general price trend, had 
increased for all services except for telecommunication. Employment had 
decreased in all markets besides the taxi market, where it had increased. 
Incomes in relation to trade and industry in general had decreased, except 
for the electricity market.
19
 Another negative effect of the liberalisation was 
deficiencies in the consumer protection in the telecommunications and 
electricity market.
20
 On the other hand, productivity had increased in postal 
services, aviation, railways and telecommunication and the accessibility had 
increased in the sectors of taxi, railways and telecommunication. Another 
                                                 
15
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 52.  
16
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 60. 
17
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 76.  
18
 SOU 2005:4.  
19
 SOU 2005:4, p. 48. 
20
 SOU 2005:4, p. 71.  
 13 
positive effect was that the market concentration had decreased in all 
markets, naturally one of the purposes with the liberalisation.
21
 The report 
emphasised though that many components affect the markets,
22
 and that all 
visual effects probably were not a cause only by the liberalisation. The 
changes on the market also depend on the specialities of the sector, e.g. it is 
almost impossible to know if the price changes in electricity would have 
been similar or not had the liberalisation not taken place.
23
 It is also difficult 
to understand how much the liberalisation has affected the 
telecommunications since the technique had developed a lot during the years 
and the internationalization had affected the market.
24
  
 
The report discussed what to learn from the liberalisation. For one thing, 
liberalisation did not mean that the markets should be unregulated; on the 
contrary, the markets needed a rather vast regulation to work satisfyingly. 
The report also pointed out that liberalisation of markets involved both 
revenue and costs and that it influences not only the parts of the economy 
that are directly affected, but other parts as well. Other consequences to 
consider was the obvious importance of that the State owned the largest 
companies in these markets and that the position of the consumers could 
change.
25
 For example, consumer support was discussed, especially in the 
telecommunication and electricity market.
26
 According to the Commission 
that evaluated the liberalisation of these markets, “strong, separate and 
independent regulatory authorities are often a condition for a successful 
liberalisation.”27    
 
In the government bill, the information from the report was taken into 
consideration. The government bill pointed out that the conditions for using 
the infrastructure had to be regulated in order to make a functioning 
                                                 
21
 SOU 2005:4, p. 48.  
22
 SOU 2005: 4, p. 73.  
23
 SOU 2005:4, p. 51. 
24
 SOU 2005:4, p. 59 .  
25
 SOU 2005:4, p. 73.  
26
 SOU 2005:4, p. 72. 
27
 SOU 2005:4, p. 63. 
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competition possible. Therefore it could be seen at an early stage in the 
reform of the pharmacy market, that it was necessary to separate the 
infrastructure. The company Apotekens Service AB was given the 
responsibility to keep the infrastructure available to all performers, in 
conditions that are competitive neutral.
28
  
 
In 2008 Apoteket AB lost a part of their sole right to engage in retail trade 
in non-prescription and prescription medicinal preparations, since the sales 
of non-prescription nicotine medicinal preparations had been put into full 
competition.
29
 This led partly to an increased number of permissions for 
retail trade. Both bigger and very small companies obtained such a 
permission. When the retail trade is put into full competition, the conditions 
for retail sale are also altered. The government bill estimated that new 
performers in the pharmacy market would probably use their own transport 
and logistics systems, or even other distributors that those being active in 
the market at the time. That would imply that even this area would 
experience a competition situation.
30
  
 
According to the government bill, the liberalisation in other European 
countries had led to better service, e.g. better opening hours and developed 
advice service. However, increased price pressure and liberalisation in rules 
concerning ownership had not been noted to a greater extent. Comparisons 
with other countries that had carried out a liberalisation of the pharmacy 
market showed that in Norway three chains had approximately 80 % of the 
market and in Iceland two chains had approximately 90 %. Both Norway 
and Iceland had a considerable increase of the number of pharmacies, 
though mostly in the town areas.
31
      
 
The reform endeavoured to give the consumers an increased accessibility to 
medicinal preparations, better service and better advice service. One of the 
                                                 
28
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 76.  
29
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 77. 
30
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 78. 
31
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 79. 
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purposes was also to lower the medicinal preparations costs, to the 
consumers’ and the public’s advantage. The reform should make use of the 
allowance to the pharmacies to improve the use of medicinal preparations in 
combination with the efforts within the health and medical service. One 
requirement was that the demands on competence and security in supply of 
medicinal preparations would remain.
32
        
 
2.4 The Selling of the pharmacies  
Before the selling of the pharmacies, pharmacies were grouped in clusters. 
Apoteket Omstrukturering AB (which will be mentioned as 
Omstrukturering AB), a company owned by the state, sold eight clusters to 
four private players in the market. Omstrukturering AB also had the 
assignment to found a company with maximum 200 pharmacies that would 
have private entrepreneurs as joint owners. After the selling of the clusters, 
Omstrukturering AB were transformed into a holding company with two 
subsidiary companies – Apoteksgruppen i Sverige AB and  Apoteksgruppen 
i Sverige Förvaltning AB. At the same time Omstrukturering AB changed 
its name to Apoteksgruppen i Sverige Holding AB (which will be 
mentioned as Holding AB). The State owns all the shares in this company.
33
 
In 2012, pharmacies were separated from Apoteket AB to be sold.
34
    
 
2.5 The audit in the selling of the 
pharmacies  
The Swedish National Audit Office presented a report concerning the selling 
of the pharmacies to the Swedish Parliament on 17 April 2012. The purpose 
of the report was to investigate whether the State had fulfilled their 
                                                 
32
 Prop. 2008/09:145, p. 80. 
33
 Riksrevisionen, p. 11. 
34
 Riksrevisionen, p. 12. 
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undertaking on the pharmacy market, which requires regulation, government 
ownership, subsidizing and supervision.
35
 The report would examine if the 
selling had been made in an effective and businesslike manner
36
 and if it had 
been expediently accounted for.
37
  
 
The ownership directive of Apoteket Omstrukturering AB does not show 
that the company has a specifically assignment from the Government to 
judge the buyers of the pharmacies on short-term or long-term perspectives, 
which is being criticized. Such an assignment could have identified risks 
and possibilities with fulfilling the purposes of selling the pharmacies. It 
would also have given a hint of how the possibilities and risks could have 
been handled, considering the State’s relation to the players in the market. 
Analysing the risks of the market more carefully would have been purposive 
since the Government could have examined and considered measures to 
counteract the risks and support the purposes of selling the pharmacies 
(increased accessibility, better service and lower costs on medicinal 
preparations).
38
  
 
Another aspect that was criticized was that while planning the selling it was 
unclear how central authorities would precise rules and conditions on time. 
That probably affected the interest of the market. The Government did not 
either clarify what kind of preparations Apoteket AB were allowed to make. 
When Omstrukturering AB formally became the parent company of 
Apoteket AB, it started a complicated process to limit Apoteket’s 
acquisition and cooperation strategies. However, it was difficult to direct 
Apoteket and its board, which was not purposive to the preparations and 
carrying through of the selling process.
39
   
 
Holding AB had an information advantage since the company had the same 
management as it had while it was called Omstrukturering AB and sold 
                                                 
35
 Riksrevisionen, p. 11.  
36
 Riksrevisionen, p. 12.  
37
 Riksrevisionen, p. 54.  
38
 Riksrevisionen, p. 55-56.   
39
 Riksrevisionen, p. 56-57.  
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clusters of pharmacies. This meant Holding AB had knowledge of the four 
new cluster buyers that the other players in the market could not have in the 
same way. This meant Apoteksgruppen i Sverige AB held a unique position 
since it was a part of the holding company’s group. The consequences were 
that an asymmetry of information was created in the market – thus no 
effective competition or equal conditions.
40
        
 
Another problem was that the Government did not give enough information 
in the 2012 budget government bill and the official letter 2011 on 
undertakings with government ownership. The Swedish National Audit 
Office did not approve of the Government’s accountancy, but considered it 
scanty, indistinct and non-purposive. The accountancy does not either 
clearly show the relations between the State, Holding AB and 
Apoteksgruppen i Sverige AB. Both the Swedish Competition Authority 
and the Swedish National Audit Office pointed out that the Government 
needed to give information on the market share of Apoteket AB. The State’s 
indirect control of both the former company Apoteket AB and the still 
existing company Apoteksgruppen i Sverige AB should be taken into 
consideration.
41
 Apoteket AB was the legal seller of the cluster of 
pharmacies, therefore its accountancy is a part of the inspection.
42
 
 
The Swedish National Audit Office saw problems with transparency and 
ambiguities and recommended the Government to approve their 
accountancy, map the State’s share of the pharmacy market, inquire the 
information advantage and articulate a plan for the development of Holding 
AB.
43
     
 
 
 
                                                 
40
 Riksrevisionen, p. 57-58. 
41
 Riksrevisionen, p. 58-60. 
42
 Riksrevisionen, p. 12.  
43
 Riksrevisionen, p. 60-61. 
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3 The Swedish monopoly on 
the retail of alcoholic 
beverages 
3.1 Changes while becoming a Member 
State 
On 1 July 1991, the Swedish Government applied for membership in the 
European Union. On 1 January 1994, the EEA agreement came into force.
44
 
The EEA agreement practically stated the same demands considering State 
monopolies of a commercial character as the TFEU does today.
45
 In the 
discussion concerning the Swedish monopoly on the retail alcohol sales – 
Systembolaget, Sweden meant that there was no discrimination of foreign 
manufacturers or wholesalers. The monopoly was said to have been 
motivated from a health and welfare perspective. The European 
Commission was not a contracting party, but convinced the Swedish 
Government that the monopoly on import, export, manufacturing and 
wholesale of alcoholic beverages was incompatible with the EU regulation. 
The Commission was of the opinion that if the discriminating effects were 
removed, it had no reason, on its own initiative, to take measures against 
this monopoly. This made the Swedish Government change its position and 
declared that it willingly would wind up the monopoly on import, export, 
manufacturing and wholesales. The Swedish Parliament confirmed this 
standpoint on 20 April 1994, when it approved of the government bill 
concerning guidelines for a new system.
46
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3.2 The ECJ judgment in the Franzén case 
A few years before the Hanner case, 1995, the Landskrona district court 
referred questions to the ECJ concerning the State monopoly on the retail of 
alcoholic beverages. Harry Franzén was charged with violation of 
Alkohollagen – the Law on Alcohol, because he had sold wine bought at 
Systembolaget or imported from Denmark.
47
 The district court asked the 
ECJ if Systembolaget was consistent with Article 30 Treaty of Rome – 
which is equivalent to Article 34 TFEU, and if Systembolaget was an 
infringement of Article 37 Treaty of Rome – Article 37 TFEU.48  
 
According to the Law on Alcohol, only companies who had a production 
license and a wholesale license were allowed to produce alcoholic 
beverages. A production license involves a wholesale license on similar 
products. Alcoholic beverages containing an alcoholic strength by volume 
over 2,25 % could be imported only by those who had one of these licenses. 
The Alcohol Inspectorate issued the licenses on the basis of applications 
with enclosed documents which were requested according to the instructions 
of the Alcohol Inspectorate. The applicants submitted a payment of a fixed 
charge, 25 000 SEK, together with the application. The sum was not repaid 
if the application was rejected. The Alcohol Inspectorate was obliged to 
make an objective, non-discriminating decision based on the applications, 
taking into account the personal and economical situation of the applicant, 
together with other circumstances of importance, e.g. professional 
knowledge. The applicants were not obliged to have storage capacity in 
Sweden if they delivered the goods directly to buyers located in Sweden. 
The applicants had to provide a bank guarantee and a yearly fee, 10 000-
323 750 SEK, depending on the product and quantity.
49
            
 
                                                 
47
 C-189/95 Franzén, para. 2 and 27. 
48
 Franzén, para. 29.  
49
 Franzén, para. 4-12. 
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The ECJ handled Articles 34 and 37 TFEU separately. Firstly it established 
that the purpose of Article 37 TFEU is to maintain the fundamental 
principle free movement of goods, e.g. through requiring abolishment of 
quantitative restrictions.
50
 It also stated that Article 37 does not prohibit 
monopolies, but demands adjustment to the common market.
51
 Mr. Franzén 
asserted that Systembolaget’s assortment was chosen through restrictive and 
arbitrary conditions and that these were impossible to control.
52
 The ECJ did 
not consider the methods of Systembolaget to be discriminating, nor did 
they treat imported products unfairly.
53
 Systembolaget’s purchase plan was 
based on consumer demand and in consultation with the consumer, producer 
and importer organization. Systembolaget’s offer calls were for all 
companies, irrespective of their origin, who had a license for wholesale or 
production. Systembolaget selected the offers only on commercial or quality 
criteria. It was true, which Franzén pointed out, that Systmbolaget only kept 
the products in their basic assortment if the sales reached a certain market 
share and quantity, but this did not lead to unfair treatment and the demands 
were justified. The traders also had other ways to market their products if 
they were not approved, e.g. their products could be marketed on a trial 
basis during a period. Finally, the traders had the right to know the reasons 
for The Alcohol Inspectorate’s decision and they had the possibility to 
appeal to an independent board, Alkoholsortimentsnämnden.
54
 Article 37 
TFEU was not neglected by Systembolaget.
55
 The monopoly’s sales 
network was not compromising the consumers’ possibilities to have access 
to alcoholic beverages, domestic or imported.
56
 The promotion of alcoholic 
beverages was applied in the same way regardless of the origin of the 
products, nor was that a problem.
57
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Article 34 TFEU on the other hand, requested more than Systembolaget 
could fulfil. The traders had to submit a large payment along with its 
application which was not repaid if the application was rejected.  Those who 
had a licence had to annually pay a supervision fee, 10 000-323 750 SEK, 
depending on what kind of beverages the sales concerned, produced 
quantity and sold quantity. The traders were also obligated to have storage 
capacity in Sweden. Consequently, the Swedish regulation was inconsistent 
with Article 34.
58
 The Swedish Government referred to Article 36 TFEU 
(also Article 36 in the Treaty of Rome) and argued that the Swedish 
regulation was founded on the interest of protecting the health of humans. 
However, the Government had not shown that the measures taken with the 
fees etc. were in proportion to the purpose. Accordingly, Articles 34 and 36 
TFEU precluded the Swedish regulation concerning licences to import 
alcoholic beverages.
59
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 Franzén, para. 70-71 and 73. 
59
 Franzén, para. 74-77. 
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4 The EU rules on State 
monopolies  
4.1 Article 37 TFEU 
Article 37 states: 
 
1. Member States shall adjust any State monopolies of a commercial 
character so as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the 
conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists 
between nationals of Member States.  
 The provisions of this Article shall apply to any body through 
which a Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly 
supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports 
between Member States. These provisions shall likewise apply to 
monopolies delegated by the State to others. 
2. Member States shall refrain from introducing any new measure which 
is contrary to the principles laid down in paragraph 1 or which 
restricts the scope of the articles dealing with the prohibition of 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions between Member States. 
3. If a State monopoly of a commercial character has rules which are 
designed to make it easier to dispose of agricultural products or obtain 
for them the best return, steps should be taken in applying the rules 
contained in this Article to ensure equivalent safeguards for the 
employment and standard of living of the producers concerned. 
 
According to the ECJ, this Article is specifically applicable on the exclusive 
rights of a commercial monopoly owned by the state.
60
 Also in the Hanner 
case, the ECJ established that Article 37 TFEU is applicable on state 
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 Franzén, para. 35.  
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monopolies.
61
 Apoteket was a state monopoly of a commercial character 
since it was engaged in retail sale of medicinal preparations.
62
   
 
As mentioned above, it is established that the purpose of Article 37 is to 
maintain the fundamental principle free movement of goods. The free 
movement is supported by that quantitative restrictions and measures with 
similar effects are prohibited. The purpose of abolishment of quantitative 
restrictions is to maintain normal conditions of competition between the 
Member States in cases where a product is sold by a State monopoly of 
commercial character. However, this Article does not demand abolishment 
of monopolies, but dictates that the monopolies shall be adjusted in a way 
that does not discriminate the citizens of the Member States as regards 
procurement and marketing conditions. The purpose of the Article is to 
unite the demands required by the establishment and functioning of the 
common market with the Member States’ possibility to maintain some 
monopolies of a commercial character, that have the purpose of 
accomplishing the pursuit of public interest. The intention is to eliminate 
obstacles to the free movement of goods with the exception of limitations 
that are a necessary consequence of the monopoly’s existence.63 This was 
also repeated in the Hanner judgment.
64
 Non-discrimination means that 
products derived from other Member States may not be “put at a 
disadvantage, in law or in fact”.65 The ECJ referred as well to this statement 
in the Hanner case.
66
       
 
In the Franzén case, the ECJ stated that it was uncontested that 
Systembolaget aimed at pursuing a public interest while protecting the 
public health.
67
 The ECJ also established that the criteria and selection 
methods that used by Systembolaget were neither discriminating nor putting 
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imported products at a disadvantage.
68
 The retail network of Systembolaget 
had flaws but did not largely influence the selling of imported products 
negatively.
69
 Consequently, Systembolaget was in that part compatible with 
Article 37.
70
  
 
In the Hanner judgment, ECJ examined whether the organization of the 
pharmacy monopoly risked to put medicinal preparations from other 
countries at disadvantage.
71
 Concerning the requirements of a state 
monopoly, the ECJ again stated the need of independent criteria, but 
emphasised the demands on transparency, motivating decisions, an 
independent monitoring procedure, and accessibility for the consumers.
72
 
The 1996 agreement between the State and Apoteket AB did not exclude 
discrimination since id had no regulations on either a purchase plan, or a 
system of calls for tenders. The Law on medicinal preparations did not give 
an opportunity to see the reasons for rejection or appeal the decision to an 
independent supervisory authority. Apoteket seemed to freely being able to 
chose their assortment. The Swedish government did not refer to another 
measure that would compensate the lack of structural guaranties.
73
 These 
circumstances were enough for the ECJ to rule out the organization and 
functioning of Apoteket as disadvantageous for medicinal preparations from 
other Member States. Discrimination were thus not excluded and the 
monopoly was inconsistent with Article 37.1 TFEU. The ECJ did not find it 
necessary to examine whether Apoteket in fact put a medicinal preparation 
from another state at disadvantage.
74
   
 
4.2 Article 34 TFEU  
Article 34 states that: 
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Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States. 
 
Article 34 is applicable on situations that do not concern the operation of a 
monopoly, but have a bearing upon it.
75
 The ECJ has in earlier case-law 
established that “all trading rules which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade constitute 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions”.76 
According to the ECJ, Systembolaget had such an effect. The licensing 
system was an obstacle to imported alcoholic beverages because of the high 
demands on storage and the higher costs.
77
 Thus, the Swedish legislation 
was in this part incompatible with Article 34.
78
    
 
4.3 Article 36 TFEU 
According to article 36:  
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the 
protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States.  
  
The ECJ established in the Franzén case that measures inconsistent with 
Article 34 TFEU could be justified by Article 36. However, according to 
ECJ’s case-law, the measures need to be in proportion to the purpose, and 
this purpose shall not be fulfilled by measures less restrictive of trade within 
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the Community.
79
 The Swedish Government referred to Article 36 TFEU in 
the Franzén case and maintained the Swedish legislation’s foundation – the 
protection of the health of humans.
80
 The protection of the human health 
was indeed such an interest granted by Article 36, but the Swedish 
Government had not proved that the licensing system was proportionate to 
that purpose or that the purpose could not be fulfilled by measures limiting 
the trade to a less extent.
81
 Consequently, The Swedish licensing system was 
incompatible with Articles 34 and 36 TFEU.
82
  
 
4.4 Article 106 TFEU 
Article 106 states: 
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States 
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to 
the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to those rules 
provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109.  
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application 
of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, 
of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade 
must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the 
interests of the Union.  
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of 
this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate 
directives or decisions to Member States.   
 
The ECJ reminded that a Member State, according to case-law, can refer to 
Article 106.2 TFEU (previously Article 86.2 EC) to motivate a company 
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having exclusive rights, inconsistent with Article 37.1 TFEU. This is 
possible if the company is entrusted with services of general economic 
interest, the tasks can be achieved only through granting these rights and 
during the circumstances that the development of the market is not affected 
in such a manner as to being inconsistent with the interests of the 
Community.
83
   
 
However, the sales regime in the Hanner case was not considered being 
founded on Article 106.2. The reason for that was the lack of a selection 
system excluding all sorts of discrimination.
84
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5 Analysis 
When the Swedish pharmacy monopoly was established 1970, the purpose 
of the monopoly was to adapt to the medical, technical and economical 
development. Those purposes should always be important, independent on 
who owns the pharmacy. The Swedish National Audit Office has a very 
good point when it states that the owners of the pharmacies need to strive to 
fulfil the goals and the purpose of the business. The shortage of 
transparency is problematic, both on a national and on a European level. The 
purposes as they are being presented in the Government bill are indeed 
expected, and honourable in an EU perspective, but the Government has an 
obligation to fulfil its duties. While reading the report on liberalisation of 
the other markets, the Government must have understood that there would 
be difficulties and that the markets are not easily controlled with all its 
players and effects from other markets, e.g. within the EU.  
 
The pharmacy monopoly will probably not arise again. Nevertheless, there 
still are problems that need to be solved in the pharmacy market. The 
inconsistency with EU regulations could probably have been cured by 
another regulation than the one that was chosen by the Government. The 
pharmacy monopoly could probably have been adjusted in way resembling 
to the adjustment of Systembolaget, or it could have used a procurement 
procedure when buying medicinal preparations. In such a way, the best 
medicinal preparations to the best price would have reached the consumers.   
 
Only by looking at the two cases Franzén and Hanner, you can see the 
development of EU case-law. The organization of Systembolaget, which 
Sweden had adjusted in order to be approved as a member of the EU, 
became a bit of a model to the pharmacy monopoly when the ECJ tried the 
Hanner case. The EU case-law is in many ways built in principles, which is 
important to remember. The free movement on goods can be restricted in 
order to consider public interests, but it must be proportionate. The 
 29 
principle on transparency is also important when it comes to state 
monopolies. Since the EU is such a huge institution, with many members 
and many wills, it is inestimable that the Member State can understand what 
is happening in the EU and that the citizens can understand what the States 
are doing in order to follow the EU regulation. Still the ECJ has a 
complicated task in balancing between the interests of the Union and the 
approval of the Member States. Maybe that approval was a little part of the 
Franzén judgment. It is not completely impossible that the ECJ was 
sympathetically minded towards the organization of Systembolaget since 
Sweden actually had made efforts to please the Commission.  
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